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## Viewing cable 02ANKARA9058, WOLFOWITZ AND GROSSMAN PRESS TURKS FOR SUPPORT ON

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 009058

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [TU](#)  
SUBJECT: WOLFOWITZ AND GROSSMAN PRESS TURKS FOR SUPPORT ON  
IRAQ

(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, reasons 1.5,  
b/d.

### Summary

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1 . (S) On December 3, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of State Grossman met with new Turkish PM Gul, an interagency group chaired by MFA Under Secretary Ziyal, Turkish Deputy Chief of Defense General Buyukanit (DCHOD), leader of the opposition Baykal, and MND Gonul. At each meeting DepSecDef emphasized the urgency for clarity on what role Turkey is prepared to play in possible military actions in Iraq. Specifically, DepSecDef noted that without the imminent resumption of military-to-military talks, site surveys of Turkish facilities, and site preparations, the "Northern Option" would soon be out of the question. DepSecDef noted the USG needed an answer by December 6 and outlined the significant assistance package the USG was prepared to provide should Turkey decide to become a full partner. GOT officials reiterated their redlines for an Iraq operation and highlighted the potential risks to Turkey and its economy. Gul agreed to resume military-to-military planning and to allow the U.S. to conduct site surveys of Turkish military facilities. However, he pleaded for additional time on the more fundamental decisions concerning Turkey's possible contributions, including site preparations, troop lists, role of coalition forces, and Turkish participation in the Northern Option. The GOT took the opportunity to underscore the importance of Turkey's relationship with the EU and Cyprus.

**12.** (S) After congratulating Gul on his recent formation of a new government, DepSecDef stated he and U/S Grossman were sent by President Bush to Ankara to discuss Turkey's potential contribution to preparations for possible military action against Iraq. Fully recognizing that PM Gul has been in office only a very short time, DepSecDef underscored the "real urgency" for a decision on the role Turkey would be willing to play.

**13.** (S) Noting that Turkey and the United States have had good, detailed discussions on the matter since last July, DepSecDef reminded Gul that President Bush has made no decision on whether to go to war with Iraq. The USG is making efforts to resolve this crisis peacefully, but the President is determined to have Iraq disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction, "voluntarily if possible, but, if necessary, by force." The US, DepSecDef added, is asking Turkey to be involved in the planning and preparation for the use of force against Iraq. The only chance for a peaceful outcome is to build a determined show of force. Military force is the underpinning of our diplomacy.

**14.** (S) Repeating what the USG has told Ankara it needs from Turkey, DepSecDef reviewed several key requests:

- Resumption of military-to-military planning talks;
- Permission to conduct site surveys and begin site preparation of specified Turkish military facilities;
- Turkish participation in the development of the Northern Option;
- Acceptance of proposed troop lists, including the role of possible coalition forces such as the United Kingdom;
- Removal of constraints on Operation Northern Watch;
- Approval of overflight rights; and,
- Support, if necessary, against terrorists in Northern Iraq.  
(DepSecDef noted the presence of several hundred suspected terrorists in Khurmali.)

**15.** (S) DepSecDef reemphasized the need to get an answer from Turkey as the time is approaching when planning will have to switch from preparing for both a Northern Option and a Southern Option, to solely pursuing a Southern Option. He added that if the US acts militarily against Saddam Hussein, it would do so with a significant number of other countries. DepSecDef reiterated that Turkey's red lines on military action against Iraq were also U.S. red lines:

- The territorial integrity of Iraq would be preserved;
- There would be no independent Kurdish state;
- The rights and welfare of the Turkoman people would be protected;
- Iraqi national control of Kirkuk and Mosul would be retained; and,
- Iraqi national control of the nation's oil would be retained.

**16.** (S) Turkey, DepSecDef stated, has much to gain by participating in a military action against Iraq. The conflict would be less risky, shorter in duration, and less economically damaging to Turkey's and the region's economies. The potential for creation of a vacuum in northern Iraq would be less likely. The conflict's aftermath would be easier to manage. DepSecDef stated that the United States is very aware of Turkey's concerns about the economic risks such military action could generate. For that reason, POTUS is ready to work with Congress to provide a substantial assistance package for Turkey. If the US and Turkey go to war against Iraq, this package would include:

- \$2 billion/yr for two years of some mix of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Economic Support Funds (ESF), the latter being synchronized with World Bank and IMF disbursements;
- \$1 billion in oil to be donated by other nations; and,
- Up to \$500 million in local procurement by U.S. defense forces.

**17.** (S) If Turkey commits fully, but war proves unnecessary, the President is ready to ask Congress for \$250 million in FY04 assistance and hopes to augment that amount with another \$105 million. That would be \$175 million in FMF, \$175 million in ESF, and \$5 million in International Military Education and Training funding (IMET). Complementing this would be closer cooperation on missile defense, greater access to excess defense articles, and improvements to

facilities at Incirlik and Konya military bases.

¶10. (S) DepSecDef warned that if Turkey declines this request, a war against Iraq could last longer, making it costlier and less certain about events in northern Iraq. DepSecDef emphasized the U.S. need for clarity from Turkey on its role in order to plan appropriately. If not, planning must focus solely on the Southern Option without Turkey. DepSecDef asked for a decision by the end of the week, December 6.

¶11. (S) PM Gul exclaimed "by the end of the week?!" He followed up by stating Turkey and the US have been strategic partners for decades, and Turkey wants to continue and to deepen that relationship. However, the government had just received its confidence vote, and it has only received two briefings on this matter. "We have followed this issue but, of course, it's different when you are in office," Gul added. Moreover, many pressing issues are on the government's agenda, including the approaching EU Copenhagen Summit and Cyprus.

¶12. (S) Gul acknowledged that Iraq is led by a bad regime that has caused great suffering. He conceded that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are dangerous to Turkey and the entire region. "We know that war is not good. It is to be avoided, but we understand your points." He added that Turkey has historical roots in Iraq and that Turkish security is directly affected by events in northern Iraq.

¶13. (S) "To give a political decision, we need some time, frankly speaking," Gul stated. Time is needed to shape public opinion. Gul repeated twice again that Turkey can say yes to the requests, but the government needs more time to update itself on the situation, must go to parliament, and must shape public opinion. He stated that Turkey's fragile economy is an issue with millions of unemployed. Military action against Iraq could damage progress underway in economic reform. He emphasized, "We will cooperate, we will cooperate, but we need time to study as the new Foreign Minister knows little and the new Defense Minister knows little."

¶14. (S) Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ugur Ziyal intervened making two key assertions: First, the offer DepSecDef reviewed was not commensurate with the risks and costs Turkey is being asked to bear. Second, Turkey is entering a decisive phase in its relationship with Europe due to the approaching EU summit and current state of Cyprus settlement negotiations. "If we do not pass these two hurdles (attaining a date for EU accession negotiations and a resolution of Cyprus), the devastation will preclude our ability to participate in an attack on Iraq. We cannot give you an answer before December 12, the date of the Copenhagen Summit." Ziyal added he had not briefed the Prime Minister on the terrorist danger present in Khurmal, but if the issue is terrorism, Turkey will of course be with the US. PM Gul interjected, "We will fight with you against all types of terrorism."

¶15. (S) DepSecDef stated the most urgent priority now is the need to resume planning talks, to initiate site surveys, and then to do site preparations. The next major decision point will be deploying troops to prepare for war. The ultimate decision point would be the decision to go to war. If diplomacy is going to be effective, we need to move forward, he added. Ziyal noted that the resumption of military-to-military planning and site surveys could go forward without parliamentary approval, after which the Prime Minister agreed the military-to-military planning talks can go forward.

¶16. (S) Ambassador Grossman stated that POTUS is putting much effort forward to support Turkey's desire to get a date for accession negotiations from the European Union -- "You can count on us to press this line all through December 12." Momentum is developing toward this goal due to progress in Turkey's democratic reforms and progress in the Cyprus negotiations. Grossman urged the new Turkish government to make a concrete commitment to the UN Secretary General's Cyprus plan as a basis for agreement. Doing so would positively affect Turkey's prospects to attain a date certain from the EU for accession negotiations.

¶17. (S) PM Gul responded that his government is talking to Turkish Cypriot President Denktash. He emphasized that Turkey will inevitably join the EU, "That is our mentality." When Turkey joins, he asserted, the EU will become more of a

world player. Turkey's membership would send a message to the Muslim world that being democratic is attractive.

¶18. (S) DepSecDef added that it is "an incredible strategic opportunity for the EU and I hope it doesn't blow it." But in practical terms, EU accession and Cyprus are tied. Progress on the latter would be a huge step forward toward the former. It would enable the US to be even more helpful to Turkey. Closing the meeting, DepSecDef responded to Ziyal's criticism of the assistance package, stating that "the numbers may not be big to you, but they are big to our government. They represent a major Presidential commitment." He urged the Turkish government not to go public with these figures. The public line should be simply that: The United States is ready to assist Turkey.

Roundtable Discussion at MFA

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¶19. (S) Ziyal then hosted DepSecDef and Grossman at an hour-long interagency meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The meeting focused on the Turks' proposal for a bilateral standby fund intended to sustain market confidence in Turkey's economy in the event of war with Iraq. DepSecDef agreed to explore the merits of the proposal. Following Ziyal's recap of DepSecDef's earlier meeting with PM Gul, they discussed the Prime Minister's agreement to re-start mil-mil planning talks and to permit site surveys of Turkey's military facilities. U/S Grossman had a long, follow-on discussion with the MFA representatives about Cyprus. He argued that now is the best time to resolve Cyprus -- before the EU decides on Cyprus accession December 12-13 -- and that the GOT should simply sign the first two pages of the UN plan.

¶20. (S) Bilateral Standby Fund: Ziyal opened the meeting by asking Treasury U/S Oztrak to report on his assessment of the economic consequences Turkey would face in the event of war with Iraq. Oztrak estimated the impact of an Iraq operation in terms of the financing gap for 2003: \$47 billion best case (short war) to \$58 billion worst case (long war). A war, he predicted, would cause oil and natural gas price rises, export decline, and loss of tourism and oil pipeline revenues. Psychological effects would lead to decreased consumer spending, loss of tax revenues, and increased government spending for social security and refugees. Interest rates would rise 10% and the lira's exchange rate against the dollar would fall by 28%. Post-conflict uncertainty would have a substantial impact on the economy. Oztrak also mentioned indirect costs to Turkey such as an economic slowdown in Europe which could dampen Turkey's export trade. He then boiled the factors down to three: losses in revenue, increased expenditures, and limits on access to financial markets.

¶21. (S) Both Oztrak and Ziyal argued for "early and substantial" US financial support in the form of a "standby" arrangement, mentioning a figure of \$20 billion. This, they said, would be the best way to positively influence the perception of the markets that the US would "not let Turkey go down the drain" and that the Turkish economy would "stay afloat." Turkey would be allowed to draw on these standby funds only to the degree it needed them -- less in the best case and more in the worse cases. Oztrak accepted Ambassador Pearson's point that the Turks' analysis had not factored in any of the possible medium- to longer-term benefits DepSecDef had outlined, such as an upturn in trade relations with Iraq and other neighbors as well as increased tourism in a more stable region. Oztrak also confirmed to U/S Grossman that Turkey much preferred that the USG control the escrow account rather than negotiate a new IMF standby, which "would have too many conditionalities."

¶22. (S) DepSecDef said the Turkish "standby" approach might be an alternative to the President's package he had outlined to the PM. We could not do both. The problem was how to devise a mechanism to mitigate negative market effects and create a fund Turkey could draw on only as needed. DepSecDef agreed with Ziyal's suggestion to open a "third channel" (in addition to the existing political and military ones) of economic experts to discuss the feasibility of the Turkish approach. Ziyal urged the US to begin its consultations with Capital Hill on an aid package for Turkey even as the economic experts talk, in order not to lose time.

¶23. (S) Site Surveys and Military-to-Military Planning Talks: Ziyal recapped the decisions reached in the PM's meeting: "yes" to site surveys, and re-starting the mil-mil discussions. The PM understood the need to "impress" Saddam visibly through overt cooperation. Although Turkey

understood the urgency the US attached to a political decision on furthering such cooperation, including stationing US and possibly other coalition (possibly British) troops in Turkey, Ziyal said that would be impossible before the December 12 Copenhagen EU Summit. The Parliament would have to debate and approve any influx of foreign troops into Turkey.

¶24. (S) DepSecDef underscored the need to allow site preparation teams into Turkey. They would send a strong signal to Saddam about the seriousness of the coalition's resolve. The US was prepared to spend \$200-300 million on needed construction. LTG Casey said this could involve up to 6,000 engineers and logisticians. TGS Deputy J3 MG Kalyoncu said the GOT would have to study the "legal" aspects of bringing in such large numbers of "foreign groups."

¶25. (S) The Growing Coalition: In response to Ziyal's query about the composition of the coalition, DeSecDef responded that he knew of at least 23 NATO members and aspirants who would be with us either unconditionally (16) or under another UNSCR (7). He thought France and Russia would also come around. In the Gulf region, most countries were committed privately while saying otherwise publicly. In response to Ziyal's question, he admitted Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's positions were less clear, but he thought they would end up supporting any operation.

¶26. (S) DepSecDef warned again that further delay in Turkish decision-making could sideline the Northern Option. Planning for the South was already far advanced. While the site prep teams could not actually start before mid-January, we need to know now--before they start--that Turkey would indeed allow US and possibly other coalition troops to come to Turkey. The big decision on actual use of force could come later.

¶27. (S) Finally, D/US for the Mideast Tuygan called attention to the upcoming (13-15 Dec.) Iraqi Opposition conference in London. The Group of Six had become too powerful, to the exclusion of the Turkomen. Turkey insisted that the Turkomen be included in the core group. Ziyal later emphasized that this is a critical concern for Turkey.

DCHOD Buyukanit

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¶28. (S) USG Request for Military Support: DCHOD stated the TGS was very familiar with US military requirements as well as with the discussion DepSecDef had earlier that day with PM Gul. The TGS will deliver a detailed brief on Iraq to the new government on 9 Dec. 02. The purpose of the TGS briefing will be to help the government reach necessary political decisions.

¶29. (S) DepSecDef proposed that potentially three sets of decisions are needed: (1) The first decision set, needed now, is to resume mil-to-mil planning talks, and to immediately initiate site surveys that would be followed by site preparations beginning early to mid January 03. (2) The second decision concerns acceptance of foreign troops on Turkish soil, recognizing that the earliest likely troop deployment would be 4-6 weeks from now. (3) The final decision would be to use force, should the President of the United States decide to do so (a decision he has not yet made). DepSecDef expressed appreciation that the Turkish PM recognized the USG need for a timely response and personally gave earlier that day his approval for immediately resuming mil-to-mil planning and initiating site surveys.

¶30. (S) DCHOD asked what role NATO could play in an Iraqi operation, emphasizing that it would be very helpful for Turkey to have some NATO cover. DepSecDef replied that NATO mechanisms could in principle be used for infrastructure improvements as well as potential Article 5 scenarios if conflict made it necessary to defend Turkey. Ambassador Pearson added that NATO's Prague Summit statement supporting UNSCR 1441 could be useful in providing a NATO "umbrella" for Turkish site surveys and site preparations. TGS Dep J3 emphasized that a parliamentary decision would be needed for any troop deployments, whether they were engineers conducting site preparations or combat troops.

¶31. (S) Turkey is Prepared to Deploy to Northern Iraq: DCHOD stated that the Turkish military has almost completed preparations to prevent immigration and to control IDPs inside Iraq, should military operations be required. In the event that Turkish forces deploy to Northern Iraq, the DCHOD

asked the USG to emphasize to Iraqi groups that Turkish forces were not there as an occupying force. DepSecDef responded that the best way to convince the northern Iraqi groups was to integrate all forces into a coordinated coalition that could both manage the IDP challenges and exert pressure on Baghdad. DepSecDef again reiterated the value of a two-front war to expedite successful operations; he also noted that the potential role for UK forces was not "in" northern Iraq, but deploying "through" northern Iraq.

**¶32. (S) NATO Command Structure Review:** DCHOD related that the TGS was "not happy" with a recently received draft NATO command structure document (MC324). The draft did not include any criteria by which to justify or rationalize the NATO HQ structures and their proposed locations. It gave an appearance of taking a "sudden decision" without proper criteria. DepSecDef agreed that criteria needed to be included and that USG was equally frustrated with the timing of the document.

Parliamentary Opposition CHP Leader Baykal

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**¶33. (C)** In his meeting with CHP and opposition leader Baykal, DepSecDef highlighted US support for Turkey's EU candidacy and for a definite accession negotiations date for Turkey to be granted during the EU Copenhagen summit. He reiterated the USG view that the UN proposal for a Cyprus settlement represents a way to a rapid solution and that Turkey should accept as the basis for further negotiations. On Iraq, DepSecDef underscored that:

- The US is working with a coalition of nations;
- The only way to hope for a peaceful resolution is to demonstrate a credible threat of force;
- We recognize Turkey's economic vulnerabilities;
- All nations will benefit if Iraq becomes a free, open and prosperous country; and,
- If war proves necessary, a strong coalition, including Turkey, is critical to ensuring that the conflict is short and to reducing its costs and risks.

**¶27. (C) EU accession:** Baykal regretted that an earlier Turkish government (read: his rival Ecevit) had failed to grasp the opportunity to join the EU at the same time as Greece. As a result, Turkey now works at a disadvantage compared to Greece. But CHP is committed to pursuing Turkey's EU candidacy and, in this regard, will support efforts to this end by the AK government. A "date for a date" from Copenhagen is not enough. We all need to know whether Turkey is a European or Middle Eastern country. If Turkey is rebuffed by the EU and at the same time is forced to cooperate with the US in an Iraq operation, especially in northern Iraq, then the country could become destabilized. If Turkey feels it is accepted as European, it can raise the level of its cooperation with the US; in any event, relations with the US are the pillar of Turkey's foreign policy.

**¶28. (C) Cyprus:** while supporting a fair and peaceful solution, Baykal expressed reservations whether a solution is possible in a short time and asserted CHP's dissatisfaction with the UN paper. First, a solution has to start from the post-'74 bizonality in which each community is homogeneous. Second, the paper would have Cyprus revert to a pre-'74 arrangement. One-third of the Greek Cypriots would move back to the north, which would thus have two ethnic groups, whereas the Greek Cypriot south would remain homogeneous, thereby creating a disequilibrium which would lead to loss of political equality over the next 20 years. CHP economic guru Dervis added that mixing the populations too fast would risk an incident, e.g., a killing, which would toss 10 years of good will out the window instantly. Third, Baykal continued, the proposed boundary lines are a problem.

**¶29. (C) Iraq:** reiterating his preference for a peaceful diplomatic solution, Baykal called for the elimination of WMD from the region around Turkey and expressed his desire for a democratic, peaceful regime in Baghdad. He acknowledged how critically important the Iraq question is for the US. And he noted that sometimes it is impossible for a country like Turkey to decide its own preferences in the face of the strategic interests of a country like the US. If intervention is inescapable, then:

- It should be carried out under international legitimacy with a clear legal basis;
- The burden on Turkey, both financial and refugee, must be eliminated to avoid the damage done to Turkey's economic, social and political fabric under the economic and refugee impact of the Gulf War;
- It is essential to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq (and in this regard Baykal wants a clear picture of how Turkey's concerns about Kurdish independence movements will be met); and

- Any solution must take into account the interests of the Turkomen who face Saddam Hussein's efforts to eliminate their identity and homeland in and around Kirkuk.

MOD Gonul

130. (S) DEPSECDEF's meeting with the new AK Party Minister of Defense was largely unsubstantive. Not only is Turkey's Defense Ministry restricted also exclusively to defense procurement issues, but Gonul admitted he had not yet been briefed on Iraq. DEPSECDEF outlined the nature of our close and transparent consultations to date, stressing that joint military planning is our best chance for peace. Saddam would only change his mind about obeying UNSCRs if he is convinced the only alternative is his removal by force. He would be convinced by actions, not words. Gonul agreed on the need to be firm on UNSCR 1441. He asserted that Saddam had thus far complied with 1441 and urged the US to await the inspection reports before deciding on a military option. A Turkish decision to cooperate, especially if it offered troops, would be a huge decision. DYP Chairman Ciller had lost many votes by implying she would commit Turkish troops if she became PM. That said, Gonul said Turkey would cooperate with the US, as it always had, but he hoped it would not be in a crisis.

31.(S) DEPSECDEF cautioned against "over-scaring" the Turkish people about a possible Iraq operation. Economic problems largely spring from psychological reasons. Any war could be over relatively quickly and result in some substantial benefits for Turkey. The government should begin accentuating the positive.

132. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSecDef Wolfowitz and U/S Grossman.

PEARSON